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Case Note
WATER LAW—Cooperation Abandoned to Allow Hoarding
of Water: The Supreme Court Denies Right to Divert Waters
Across State Borders Under the Red River Compact;
Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120 (2013)
Brian A. Annes*
“‘Whiskey is for drinking—water is for fighting.’ The fighting will continue
as long as water is allocated by politics instead of the market.”1

Introduction
Historically, water has caused disputes due to its variable nature and widespread
necessity. The Red River between Texas and Oklahoma is no exception. The
Red River water rights are distributed between Oklahoma, Texas, Arkansas, and
Louisiana according to the Red River Compact (Compact).2
Hoping to find alternative supply channels for a growing population, the
Tarrant Regional Water District (Tarrant), located in Texas, attempted to purchase
water from water users in Oklahoma and Arkansas.3 After these attempts failed,
Tarrant applied to the Oklahoma Water Resources Board (OWRB) for a permit
to divert water from the Red River basin in Oklahoma.4
Knowing the OWRB would deny the permit based on Oklahoma state water
laws, Tarrant filed suit to enjoin the permit denial.5 Tarrant argued the Compact
allowed the diversion of water in Oklahoma, and certain Oklahoma state laws
violated the dormant Commerce Clause.6 The United States District Court for

* J.D. candidate, University of Wyoming College of Law, class of 2015. Thanks to Brian
Fuller, Julianne Gern, and Lucas Wallace for their wonderful help during the writing process. Also,
thanks to Michael Fitzgerald and Grant Smith for their valuable insights. A special thank you to
Sam Kalen for his careful editing and guidance.
1
Terry L. Anderson, Water Needn’t Be a Fighting Word, The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 30,
1983, at 30.

Red River Compact Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-564, 94 Stat. 3305 (1980) [hereinafter
Red River Compact].
2

See Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120, 2128 (2013). The Dallas-Fort
Worth metropolitan area has grown from 5.1 million people to 6.4 million people between 2000
and 2010. Id.
3

4

Id.

5

Id.

Id.; see Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 82, §§ 1086.1(A)(3), 105.12(A), 105.16(B) (2013); Okla.
Att’y Gen. Op. No. 77-274 (1978).
6
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the Western District of Oklahoma granted the OWRB’s motion for summary
judgment, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.7
The United States Supreme Court rejected Tarrant’s arguments concerning the
compact language and the dormant Commerce Clause.8 The Court affirmed the
Tenth Circuit’s decision.9
This Case Note begins with a discussion of interstate water compacts
generally and interpretation methods, followed by a discussion of the modern
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.10 Next, the Case Note outlines the facts and
opinion of the Tarrant case.11 This Case Note argues the Court erred in holding
the Compact prohibited cross-border diversions in this situation.12 It also argues
the Oklahoma water law statutes violate the dormant Commerce Clause.13 The
Case Note concludes with how this decision affects Wyoming.14

Background
Compacts Generally
Before states entered into water compacts, the United States Supreme Court
adjudicated and apportioned use of interstate waters on a case-by-case basis.15 This
method was inefficient because of the time and cost of litigation.16 The Court, as
an expert in law and equity, was not the best option for deciding what parties with
firsthand knowledge of the circumstances should determine.17 The circumstances
at the heart of a compact are unique, and the Court conceded such circumstances
“necessitate expert administration, rather than judicial imposition of a hard and
fast rule” because of the “possibility of future change of conditions.”18 Further, the

7

Tarrant, 133 S. Ct. at 2137.

8

Id.

9

Id.

10

See infra notes 15–76 and accompanying text.

11

See infra notes 77–138 and accompanying text.

12

See infra notes 139–216 and accompanying text.

13

See infra notes 217–69 and accompanying text.

14

See infra notes 270–88 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) (addressing dispute over diversions of the
Arkansas River).
15

16
John E. Thorson et al., Dividing Western Waters: A Century of Adjudicating Rivers and
Streams, Part II, 9 U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 299, 434 (2006).
17
Id. at 104. (“The difficulties incident to litigation have led States to resort, with frequency,
to adjustment of their controversies by compact, even where the matter in dispute was the relatively
simple one of a boundary.”).
18

Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 392 (1943).
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Court’s application of a complex combination of differing state water laws creates
uncertainty.19 In response to such concerns, states began negotiating interstate
water compacts before resorting to litigation.20
An interstate compact is a contract between states enacted into law upon
congressional approval.21 When applied to interstate waterways, like rivers
crossing state boundaries, a compact expressly apportions water rights and
duties between the signatory states.22 Such apportionment is necessary to resolve
possible conflicts, like an upstream state controlling the waters flowing to other,
downstream states.23 States negotiate to find more equitable solutions to these
conflicts.24 After the states have agreed to a compact, Congress has the option of
approving the compact and transforming it into federal law.25

Compact Interpretation
Compacts are contractual agreements between states that can cover a variety of
issues.26 Congress must approve compacts before they become binding as federal
law.27 No general rules exist to resolve compact disputes when they arise, but courts

See, e.g., Montana’s Exception and Brief, Montana v. Wyoming, (2010) (No. 137), 2010
WL 4132841 (discussing an ongoing case where two conflicting state water laws are being applied
to resolve a dispute between interstate waters).
19

20
See generally Delph E. Carpenter, Address on the Application of the Reserve Treaty Powers of
the States to Interstate Water Controversies (1921), http://hdl.handle.net/10217/37424 (last visited
Nov. 14, 2013). The first interstate water compact was the Colorado River Compact, developed by
the states and approved by Congress in 1922. Colorado River Compact, 123 Colo. Sess. Laws 684,
Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 37-61-101–104 (2013).

Black’s Law Dictionary 318 (9th ed. 2009); see generally Jerome C. Muys et al., Utton
Transboundary Resources Center Model Interstate Water Compact, 47 Nat. Resources J. 17, 26–37
(Winter 2007) (addressing issues and structure of interstate water compacts).
21

22

Paul Elliott, Texas’ Interstate Water Compacts, 17 St. Mary’s L.J. 1241, 1241–45 (1986).

23

Id. at 1243.

Id.; see, e.g., Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, art. I, 63 Stat. 37 (1949) (stating the
purpose of the compact is the equitable division of water use). Consumptive use of water for each
state is apportioned under the compact. Id. art. III.
24

25
U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3; see also Barton H. Thompson, Jr. et al., Legal Control
Water Resources 894 (5th ed. 2013) (providing an example of Congress refusing to approve a
compact agreed to by the states).

of

26
Charles T. DuMars & Stephen Curtice, Interstate Compacts Establishing State Entitlements
to Water: An Essential Part of the Water Planning Process, 64 Okla. L. Rev. 515, 529 (Summer 2012).
27

Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987).
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have employed principles of contract and statutory interpretation.28 Specifically,
the Supreme Court has dealt with the importance of plain meaning, the structure
of the document, and drafting history as they relate to compacts.29 Because of the
contractual nature of compacts, courts analyze the course of dealings.30 Finally,
once compacts become federal statutes, the canon of presumption against waiver
of sovereign immunity applies.31
The first step in interpretation is determining if the plain meaning of the
contract is clear.32 If the plain meaning is clear, such meaning is applied.33
The Supreme Court in Montana v. Wyoming considered the plain meaning of
“beneficial use” within the Yellowstone River Compact to resolve a dispute.34 The
Court looked at the plain meaning of “beneficial use” to support holding there
was no quantity of water guaranteed to flow from Wyoming to Montana.35 The
Court reasoned that if the states wanted to guarantee a net flow to downstream
users, the states could have used explicit language in the compact.36
If the plain language is ambiguous, the Supreme Court can look to other tools
of interpretation to determine the intent of the parties.37 When determining the
intent of the parties in Alabama v. North Carolina, the Court found that, although
all contracts have an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, compacts are
more than contracts because Congress adopts compacts.38 As such, courts should

28
Annotation, Constitutionality, Construction, and Application of Compacts and Statutes
Involving Co-operation Between States, art. III, 134 A.L.R. Fed. 1411 (1941); Texas v. New Mexico,
482 U.S. 124 (1987) (contract law interpretation); Alabama v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 2295
(2010) (statutory interpretation); see generally Ferdinand S. Tinio, Comment, The Parol Evidence
Rule and Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence to Establish and Clarify Ambiguity in Written Contract,
40 A.L.R. 3d 1384 (1971) (contract interpretation methods); 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 410 (statutory
interpretation).
29

See infra notes 143–80 and accompanying text.

30

See, e.g., Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. at 128 (contract principles).

31

See, e.g., Alabama v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 2295, 2307 (2010) (statutory canons).

32

Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765, 1778 (2011).

33

Id.

34

Id. at 1767.

35

Id. at 1778.

Id. at 1767– 69 (using the Colorado River Compact, 42 Stat. 171 (1922), as an example of
establishing minimum flows to downstream users); see Joe Norris, Montana v. Wyoming: Is Water
Conservation Drowning the Yellowstone River Compact? 15 U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 189, 197 (Fall
2011); Shiran Zohar, A Deal is a Deal in the West, or is it? Montana v. Wyoming and the Yellowstone
River Compact, 6 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y Sidebar 160, 166–67 (Mar. 8, 2011).
36

37
Alabama v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 2295, 2309 (2010); see also K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,
Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988).
38
Alabama, 130 S. Ct. at 2312. The compact was an agreement between states concerning
radioactive waste management procedures. Id.
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not add terms, or else they risk overstepping their judicial role.39 This is the basis
of the omitted-case canon.40 When language appears in a provision of the statute,
but is omitted elsewhere, the omission is considered intentional.41
The Supreme Court has also looked at the drafting history of compacts when
determining the intent of the parties.42 In Oklahoma v. New Mexico, the Court
focused on the congressional adoption of compacts, rather than their contractual
nature, when interpreting the Canadian River Compact as it related to water
storage.43 When interpreting interstate compacts under the rules of statutory
interpretation, it is appropriate for courts to use extrinsic evidence, including
negotiating history and legislative history, to determine the meaning of the compact
language.44 When considering prior drafts of statutes, language considered and
rejected in prior drafts demonstrates intent to omit.45 Further, intention to leave
a term out can be found when a prior draft contains the language, while the final
version omits it.46
Course of dealings analysis could also be an appropriate way to interpret a
compact. In Texas v. New Mexico, the Court interpreted the Pecos River Compact
to resolve a dispute between the states.47 The Court commented that the compact,
despite congressional adoption, is a contract and “must be construed and applied
in accordance with its terms.”48 When interpreting contracts, courts may look at
the course of dealings as a factor in determining the intent of the parties.49 When
interpreting a contract, “prior negotiations and surrounding circumstances may be
considered.”50 Therefore, the same analysis may be extended to the interpretation
of a compact.

39

Id. at 2312 –13.

See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation
Texts 93 (2012).
40

41

Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983).

42

Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 221, 234–37 (1991).

of

Legal

Id.; see also Oklahoma Historical Society’s Encyclopedia of Oklahoma History and
Culture, http://digital.library.okstate.edu/encyclopedia/entries/c/ca039.html (last visited Sept.
22, 2013) (detailing the Canadian River flows from Colorado through New Mexico, Texas,
and Oklahoma).
43

44

Oklahoma, 501 U.S. at 235 n.5.

45

Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 378 n.13 (2000).

46

Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364, 374 (2008).

47

482 U.S. 124, 135 (1987).

48

Id. at 128.

49

Pac. Portland Cement Co. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 178 F.2d 541, 552 (9th Cir. 1949).

50

Id.; see also Restatement (First) of Contracts: Rules Aiding Application of Standards
§ 235(d) (1932).

of Interpretation
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The issue of federalism also becomes a factor because compacts are both
contracts and statutes, and states execute compacts.51 In Virginia v. Maryland,
the Supreme Court held, “[i]f any inference at all is to be drawn from . . . silence
on the subject of regulatory authority, we think it is that each State was left to
regulate the activities of her own citizens.”52 Further, in Alaska v. United States,
the Court declared when deciding whether waters are navigable, the analysis
must “begin with a strong presumption against defeat of a State’s title.”53 The
Court imposes a strong presumption in favor of state sovereignty when there is
a conflict between federal and state law, and it will factor the reluctance of states
to abandon their sovereign rights into any interpretation analysis.54 In Tarrant
Regional Water District v. Herrmann, the Court applied this interpretive tool to an
interstate compact.55

Dormant Commerce Clause
Under the Federal Constitution, the Commerce Clause grants Congress the
power of regulation of commerce between the states.56 States maintain the right to
regulate interstate commerce in the interest of public health and safety as long as
there is no clear congressional action to the contrary.57 States are given the power
to regulate interstate commerce, but this is not unlimited authority to protect
state interests at the expense of other states.58
The Supreme Court has developed principles to determine whether a state law
violates the Commerce Clause.59 First, the object of the law must be considered
interstate commerce.60 The Court must also look to whether Congress granted
power to the state to regulate such commerce.61 The Court must then determine
if the state laws are discriminatory on their face, in their purposes, or in their
effects.62 If discriminatory, the law is invalid unless the state can prove the law

51

Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120, 2131–33 (2013).

52

540 U.S. 56, 67 (2003).

53

521 U.S. 1, 34 (1997).

54

Tarrant, 133 S. Ct. at 2131–33.

55

Id. at 2120.

56

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

57

S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 766 (1945).

58

See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624, (1978).

C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 401 (1994) (O’Connor,
J., concurring).
59

60

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1824).

Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437,
458 (1992).
61

62

See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
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“serves a legitimate local purpose” and “this purpose could not be served as well
by available nondiscriminatory means.”63 The Court will apply strict scrutiny to
this analysis if the law is found to be discriminatory.64
Specifically, the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas
has dealt with cross-border water issues under the dormant Commerce Clause.
In City of Altus v. Carr, the district court dealt with a similar issue to the Tarrant
case.65 Altus, Oklahoma was an expanding urban center in need of water.66 The
city bought rights to groundwater from Texas water users.67 In response, Texas
passed a statute forbidding the transfer of groundwater rights to out-of-state
users.68 The district court overruled the statute because it violated the Commerce
Clause; thus, the water was able to cross state lines to where it was needed.69
Specifically, the groundwater—once pumped—became private property, and
any attempt to deny the sale of such property across state lines violated the
Commerce Clause.70
In another case, Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, the state of Nebraska
filed suit to enjoin water users in Colorado from using Nebraska groundwater
without a permit.71 The Supreme Court first held groundwater was an instrument
of commerce.72 The Court noted eighty percent of the water supply was used for
agriculture, which is an interstate enterprise, and the boundaries of groundwater
aquifers, like the Ogallala, cover multiple states.73 After concluding that “water
is an article of commerce,” the Court looked at whether the requirement of
reciprocity for transfers of water across state lines violated the dormant Commerce

63

Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986).

64

Id.

65

255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex.), summarily aff ’d, 385 U.S. 35 (1966).

66

Id. at 831.

67

Id. at 832.

68

Id.

69

Id. at 837– 40.

70

Id. at 840.

Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982); see also Douglas L. Grant,
Commerce Clause Limits on State Regulation of Interstate Water Export, http://opensiuc.
lib.siu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1310&context=jcwre (last visited Oct. 19, 2013) (discussing Sporhase).
71

72

Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 954–55.

73

Id. at 952–53.
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Clause.74 The state satisfied the purpose prong by showing that conservation of
groundwater in an area with inadequate present supply to meet its demand was
a legitimate purpose.75 However, the Court found such conservation could be
achieved through restrictions on in-state users, and the restrictions would not be
discriminatory to out-of-state parties.76 Because there was a nondiscriminatory
alternative to achieve the public policy, the statute was in violation of the dormant
Commerce Clause.77

Principal Case
Red River Compact
Oklahoma, Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana drafted the Red River Compact
following more than twenty years of negotiations.78 Congress approved the
Compact in 1980.79 The Compact allocates water resources between the states
located in the Red River basin.80 The Compact divides the basin into five reaches
and multiple subbasins within the reaches.81 In Reach II, the Compact created
five subbasins.82 Reach II, subbasin 5 encompasses parts of Texas, Oklahoma,

74

Id. at 958–60.

75

Id. at 954–55.

76

Id. at 955–56.

77

Id. at 958.

Oklahoma Water Resource Board, Red River Compact Commission, http://www.owrb.
ok.gov/rrccommission/rrccommission.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2013).
78

79

Red River Compact, supra note 2, § 1.

Id. § 1.01. The Red River basin covers a large portion of Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and
Louisiana. The river starts near the border of Texas and New Mexico, defines part of the border
between Texas and Oklahoma, and eventually flows into the Mississippi River, to be released into
the Gulf of Mexico. See Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120, 2136 (2013)
(showing a map of the entire basin).
80

Red River Compact, supra note 2, §§ 2.12, 4.01– 4.04, 5.01–5.05, 6.01–6.04, 7.01–7.02.
Natural boundaries like river basins are efficient ways to implement water resources. See Know
Your Basin?, Wyoming State Engineer’s Office, https://sites.google.com/a/wyo.gov/seo/interstatestreams/know-your-basin (last visited Nov. 2, 2013) (providing a list and map of the major basins in
Wyoming). A reach is “a continuous extent of land or water.” New Oxford American Dictionary,
1450 (3d ed. 2010). A basin is a “tract of country that is drained by a river and lakes.” Id. at 137.
Reach, basin, and subbasin are used in the Compact to delineate subdivisions of the watershed.
81

82

Red River Compact, supra note 2, §§ 5.01–5.05.
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and Arkansas, and preserves a minimum flow to Louisiana.83 Regarding Reach
II, subbasin 5, the Compact assigns “equal rights to the use of runoff originating
in subbasin 5 and undesignated water flowing into subbasin 5” if at least 3,000
cubic feet per second (cfs) are flowing down the Red River at the LouisianaArkansas border.84 This language requires the other three states to guarantee that
a minimum flow of water reaches Louisiana.85
The Compact also provides for enforcement in the form of accounting.86
Although the Compact did not specify a method of accounting, a general
accounting typically includes a determination of supply and diversion in each
state.87 The drafters saw a routine requirement of accounting for all the water in
the basin financially burdensome, but wanted to provide a method of seeking
equity within the Compact.88 Accounting over such a large area can be expensive,

83
Id.; see also The Oklahoma Water Resources Board, available at http://www.owrb.ok.gov/
util/legal.php (map of Reach II, reprinted with permission below).

84

Red River Compact, supra note 2, § 5.05.

85

Id.

Id. § 2.11; see Grant Harse, Nebraska’s Costs of Compliance with the Republican River
Compact: An Equitable Solution, 19-FALL Kan. J.L. 7 Pub. Pol’y 124, 131 (Fall 2009) (discussing
issues concerning accounting in compacts and defines accounting procedures to “determine supply,
allocations, use and compliance with the [c]ompact . . . .”).
86

87

Red River Compact, supra note 2, § 2.11; Harse, supra note 86, at 124.

88

Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120, 2127 (2013).
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time-consuming, and uncertain in outcome.89 Although a state may request an
accounting at any time, no state has ever made such a request in the history of
the Compact.90
Other important portions of the Compact explicitly address possible conflicts
between the Compact and state water law. The relevant language provides:
Each Signatory State may use the water allocated to it by this
Compact in any manner deemed beneficial by that state. Each
state may freely administer water rights and uses in accordance
with the laws of that state, but such uses shall be subject to the
availability of water in accordance with the apportionments
made by this Compact.91
Elsewhere, language discusses the limitations of the Compact:
Nothing in this Compact shall be deemed to . . . [i]nterfere with
or impair the right or power of any Signatory State to regulate
within its boundaries the appropriation, use, and control of
water, or quality of water, not inconsistent with its obligations
under this Compact.92
While Tarrant focused on the qualifiers of the language above, the OWRB focused
on the language dealing with regulation within state boundaries.93 The dispute at
issue arose from these sections of the Compact.

Factual Background
The Tarrant Regional Water District provides water to north-central Texas.94
In looking to meet the short-term and long-term demands of its expanding
population, Tarrant attempted to secure water through purchase from other
states.95 After these attempts failed, it applied for a permit from the OWRB to
divert water to Texas from a point in Oklahoma within Reach II, subbasin 5

89

Harse, supra note 86, at 138, 144.

90

Red River Compact, supra note 2, § 2.11; Tarrant, 133 S. Ct. at 2127.

91

Red River Compact, supra note 2, § 2.01.

92

Id. § 2.10.

93

See infra notes 102–14 and accompanying text.

Tarrant, 133 S. Ct. at 2128. The Tarrant Regional Water District lies outside the Red River
basin, but this was not addressed in the litigation that focused on the rights of the states. Id. at
App. B. Although the Compact is silent on whether out-of-basin use is permitted, other compacts
expressly limit water rights within the basin. See, e.g., Yellowstone River Compact, § 2, 65 Stat.
663 (1951).
94

95

Tarrant, 133 S. Ct. at 2128.
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of the Compact.96 Anticipating that OWRB would deny the permit based on
Oklahoma law, Tarrant filed suit to enjoin the OWRB’s likely denial of Tarrant’s
application.97 Tarrant claimed the Compact allowed for cross-border diversions
within Reach II, subbasin 5, and the Oklahoma statutes violated the dormant
Commerce Clause by discriminating against out-of-state applicants.98 The United
States District Court for the District of Western Oklahoma granted summary
judgment in favor of the OWRB, and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit affirmed. 99

Court’s Opinion
The Supreme Court held the Compact did not allow cross-border diversions
of water within Reach II, subbasin 5, and the dormant Commerce Clause was not
violated because all the water in Reach II, subbasin 5 was appropriated.100 The
Court first acknowledged that compacts should be interpreted through principles
of contract law.101 Looking at the plain language of section 5.05 of the Compact,
the Court disagreed with Tarrant and viewed the absence of a qualifier like
“equal rights within their state” as an indication of ambiguity, requiring further
interpretive tools to determine the intended meaning.102 Tarrant argued the plain
meaning and four corners of the Compact allowed Texas to cross state lines to
obtain its share of excess water.103 Using interpretive tools, the Court rejected
these arguments regarding the plain meaning of the Compact and four corners
analysis.104 Based on its determination that, at a minimum, silence can only be
considered ambiguous, the Court relied heavily on a state’s general reluctance
to abandon sovereign powers.105 The Court also utilized the standards of other
compacts and course of performance under the Compact between the states to
reach its holding.106
Id. Tarrant applied for a permit to divert a total of 310,000 acre-feet per year from the
Kiamichi. Id. Average annual flow of the Kiamichi between 1950 and 2007 was about 2.87
million acre-feet per year. OWRB, Oklahoma Comprehensive Water Plan Physical Water
Supply Availability Report, Table 4-3 (2011), http://www.owrb.ok.gov/supply/ocwp/pdf_ocwp/
WaterPlanUpdate/OCWP_PhysicalWaterSupplyAvailabilityReport.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2013).
96

97

Tarrant, 133 S. Ct. at 2129.

98

Id. at 2128–29.

99

Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 656 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2011).

100

Tarrant, 133 S. Ct. at 2137.

101

Id. at 2130.

102

Id. at 2130–32.

Brief for Petitioner at 26, Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann 133 S. Ct. 2120 (2013)
(No. 11-889), 2013 WL 648740 [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
103

104

Tarrant, 133 S. Ct. at 2130–32.

Id. at 2132–33. The Court’s determination that silence is ambiguous conflicts with the
omitted-case canon. See, e.g., Alabama v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 2295, 2312–13 (2010).
105

106

Tarrant, 133 S. Ct. at 2133–36.
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In interpreting the Compact, the Court held that a state’s reluctance to give
up sovereign power should be one of the most important factors to consider.107
The Court found there is a strong presumption in favor of state ownership of
the waters of the basin by relying on prior cases that states held vested rights
to their “navigable waters.”108 From these cases, the Court further conveyed,
“[i]f any inference at all be drawn from [such] silence on the subject of regulatory
authority, we think it is that each State was left to regulate the activities of her own
citizens.”109 Therefore, the Court held it was unlikely the states intended to hand
over their sovereign rights through silence.110
After making a strong presumption against surrendering sovereign powers, the
Court looked at customary practices in other compacts.111 Relying on compacts
like the Snake River Compact and the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, the
Court determined standard practice for permitting diversions across state lines is
to expressly declare such cross-border diversion rights in the agreements.112 The
Court also considered other compacts that provided specifically how such crossborder agreements would be managed.113 With this support, the Court held that
explicit language regarding the cross-border rights and specific language on the
implementation are standard in other compacts, and silence here was insufficient
evidence of intent in this case to create a cross-border diversion right.114
Next, the Court looked at the course of performance of the parties.115 It
noted this was the first instance of an entity attempting to assert cross-border
diversion rights under section 5.05 since Congress officially adopted the Compact
in 1980.116 Tarrant’s behavior when attempting to purchase water rights prior to

107

Id. at 2132.

Id.; see also Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842) (navigable waters);
United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (power to control waters); Alaska, 521 U.S. at 34
(1997) (presumption). The Court does not address whether or not the Red River is navigable, but
only cites cases involving navigable waters in its sovereignty analysis. Tarrant, 133 S. Ct. at 2132; see
generally PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1227–28 (2012) (defining “navigable”).
108

109

Tarrant, 133 S. Ct. at 2132 (quoting Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56, 67 (2003)).

110

Id. at 2133.

111

Id. at 2133–35.

Id.; see Brief for Respondents at 30 n.10, Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann 133 S. Ct.
2120 (2013) (No. 11-889), 2013 WL 1618026 [hereinafter Brief for Respondents] (listing compacts
with explicit language granting cross-border access).
112

Tarrant, 133 S. Ct. at 2134; see also Kansas-Nebraska Big Blue River Compact, art. VII(1),
86 Stat. 198 (defining which parties can assert rights); Belle Fourche River Compact, art. VI,
58 Stat. 96–97 (determining who bears the costs of diversions); Arkansas River Basin Compact,
Kansas-Oklahoma, art. VII(A), 80 Stat. 1411 (implementing administration of diversions).
113

114

Tarrant, 133 S. Ct. at 2134.

115

Id. at 2135.

116

Id.
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the attempt to assert its right under the Compact was also significant in holding
the OWRB’s interpretation to be more consistent with the drafters’ intent.117
The Court also rejected Tarrant’s argument that the Compact itself
allowed Tarrant to divert water from Oklahoma.118 Tarrant argued the location
of boundaries between subbasins within Reach II indicated that subbasin 5
contained surplus water that no state intended to use.119 Subbasins 1 through
4 could be dammed to provide unlimited water to each of the states, therefore,
anything flowing into subbasin 5 was excess.120 Access to the surplus was only
limited by capping each state’s share at twenty-five percent of the excess water in
subbasin 5.121 Further, because the subbasin contained waters the states did not
intend to use, there would be no detriment to cross-border diversions.122 The
Court was not persuaded by this argument, and looked at section 5.05 of the
Compact where the language is not only “equal rights” to “water flowing into
subbasin 5,” but also “runoff originating in subbasin 5.”123 Therefore, the Court
concluded subbasin 5 did not exclusively consist of excess water.124
Tarrant also argued “equal rights” meant each state was guaranteed twentyfive percent of the excess water in subbasin 5.125 The OWRB argued the language
of section 5.05 assigns a cap of twenty-five percent on the right to access
water in the subbasin, but the states are not guaranteed the full twenty-five
percent.126 Further, Tarrant argued the amount of excess water within each state
was not equal to twenty-five percent of the total excess water within Reach II,
subbasin 5.127 Specifically, Tarrant claimed more than twenty-five percent of the
water was in Oklahoma.128 Tarrant argued more than twenty-five percent of the
freshwater was in Oklahoma and only sixteen percent was located in Texas.129
This was inconsistent with the OWRB calculations placing at least twenty-nine

117

Id.

118

Id. at 2135–36.

119

Id.

120

Id. at 2135–36.

Id. This assumes flow at the Arkansas-Louisiana border is at least 3,000 cfs. See Red River
Compact, supra note 2, § 5.05.
121

122

Tarrant, 133 S. Ct. at 2135–36.

123

Id. at 2136.

124

Id.

125

Id.

126

Brief for Respondents, supra note 112, at 28–29.

127

Tarrant, 133 S. Ct. at 2136.

128

Id.

Id.; see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 103, at 9 n.5 (discussing relevant details of the
1970 report).
129
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percent of the water in the subbasin within Texas.130 Ultimately, the Court did
not have to decide which calculations were accurate, and held the “equal rights”
referred only to a limit of twenty-five percent instead of a guarantee.131 The Court
maintained if Texas believed Oklahoma was using more than twenty-five percent,
it could request an accounting pursuant to section 2.11 of the Compact.132
The Court also disagreed with Tarrant’s alternative argument that the
Oklahoma water laws violated the dormant Commerce Clause. The Court found
all the waters within Reach II, subbasin 5 were allocated; therefore, Oklahoma
statutes did not apply to interstate waters.133 For the dormant Commerce Clause
to apply, there has to be interstate commerce.134 In this case, the Court found the
Compact appropriated all water within the Red River basin.135 Because all the
water within the basin was appropriated, the Court found there was no interstate
commerce.136 The Compact assumes each state only uses its allocated twenty-five
percent of the excess unless accounting demonstrates otherwise.137 The Court
found the Compact governs all interstate waters in the basin, and the Oklahoma
statutes cannot discriminate against any interstate commerce because there is no
interstate commerce to regulate.138 Ultimately, the Court held Oklahoma water
statutes did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.139

Analysis
The United States Supreme Court erred in its decision. First, Tarrant’s
interpretation of the Compact was correct; the Court should have placed more
weight on the structure of the Compact, course of dealings, and prior draft
history.140 Proper interpretation of the Compact would not have resulted in
involuntary abandonment of state sovereign powers.141 Second, contrary to the
Court’s conclusion, there was unappropriated water under the Compact, and
Oklahoma’s discriminatory state laws violated the dormant Commerce Clause.142

130
Tarrant, 133 S. Ct. at 2136; see also Brief for Respondents, supra note 112, at 26, 47–48, &
n.17 (discussing the twenty-nine percent calculation and pitfalls of the Tarrant report).
131

Tarrant, 133 S. Ct. at 2136.

132

Id.

133

Id. at 2137.

134

Id.

135

Id.

136

Id.

137

Id.

138

Id.

139

Id.

140

See infra notes 144–92 and accompanying text.

141

See infra notes 193–200 and accompanying text.

142

See infra notes 218–70 and accompanying text.
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Finally, this decision will have far reaching effects on Wyoming’s interstate
water compacts.143

Compact Interpretation
Contrary to the Supreme Court’s conclusion, the Compact’s plain meaning
permits Tarrant to divert water in Oklahoma.144 If a court finds the plain meaning
ambiguous, it can use interpretive rules.145 When interpreting the Compact, more
weight should be given to the structure of the Compact as a whole, the drafting
history, and the course of dealings of the parties.146 Because the Compact is a
statute, state sovereignty should be a factor.147 But the Court erred in deciding the
states did not abrogate their sovereignty.148 Finally, the policy behind water law
strongly favors permitting Tarrant’s proposed cross-border diversion.149
The Supreme Court views compacts between states as contracts Congress
approves and requires interpretation through principles of contract law and
statutory canons.150 Both interpretation methods first focus on the unambiguous,
plain meaning of the language in dispute.151 If the plain meaning of the compact
is clear, that is the interpretation that should be used.152 The first distinction
that must be made is whether the “equal rights” language in section 2.01 of
the Compact refers to a right to water up to a maximum of twenty-five percent
or a guaranteed entitlement to twenty-five percent of the excess in Reach II,
subbasin 5.153 The plain meaning of a “right” is a “legally enforceable claim”
or “legal guarantee” of an “interest.”154 The use of the term “right” within the
Compact is not a mere opportunity to divert excess water.155 Rather, “right” in

143

See infra notes 271–89 and accompanying text.

144

See infra notes 150–56 and accompanying text.

145

See infra note 157 and accompanying text.

146

See infra notes 157–92 and accompanying text.

147

See infra notes 193–200 and accompanying text.

148

Id.

149

See infra notes 201–17 and accompanying text.

Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987) (contract principles); Alabama v. North
Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 2295, 2312 (2010) (statutory canons).
150

151
Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765, 1778 (2011) (discussing contract principles);
Alabama, 130 S. Ct. at 2306 (exemplifying statutory use of plain meaning of “sanctions” in
the compact).
152
See Montana, 131 S. Ct. at 1778 (addressing the plain meaning of “beneficial uses” in the
Yellowstone River Compact).
153

See Red River Compact, supra note 91, § 2.01.

154

Black’s Law Dictionary 1436 (9th ed. 2009).

155

See Red River Compact, supra note 83, § 5.05.
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the Compact is a guaranteed entitlement for the states in the Compact to use
twenty-five percent of the excess in subbasin 5 of Reach II when the Red River’s
flow at the Arkansas-Louisiana border is at least 3,000 cfs.156 The plain meaning
of “equal rights” guarantees all the states twenty-five percent of the surplus of
Reach II, subbasin 5. The next issue is how the states satisfy this guarantee, and if
they can do so by cross-border diversions.
Tarrant has a right to divert water in Oklahoma to fulfill their guaranteed
rights under the Compact because the structure of the Compact allows it.
The Supreme Court looks at the structure of statutes to resolve interpretation
ambiguities.157 In the Compact, specific qualifiers were used in other sections
of the Compact but left out of the language regarding Reach II, subbasin 5.158
For example, the Compact describes states as having “free and unrestricted use
of the water of this subbasin within their respective states,” with respect to Reach
II, subbasin 3.159 Also, in section 6.03, which governs Reach III, “Texas and
Louisiana within their respective boundaries shall each have the unrestricted use of
the water of this subbasin.”160 When a term is used in another provision, the court
assumes omissions elsewhere are intentional.161 Because the Court is reluctant to
write language into compacts, and the Compact drafters specified elsewhere that
unrestricted uses within subbasins were restricted within state boundaries, it is
clear the drafters intended Reach II, subbasin 5 to be a borderless basin with equal
access for all states.162
The Compact contemplated in some sections that states are limited to
use waters within their boundaries.163 In the section concerning Reach II,
subbasin 5, that language is absent, demonstrating the parties did not contemplate
the waters of Reach II, subbasin 5 to be limited within the state boundaries.164 This
distinction demonstrates the intent of the parties because the Court is reluctant to
add terms to contracts.165
156

Id.

157

Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 22–23 (1983).

Compare Red River Compact, supra note 2, at §§ 5.03(b) & 6.03 (qualitative language
present), with Red River Compact, supra note 2, at § 5.05; see generally Antonin Scalia & Bryan
A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 93 (2012) (“The principle that a
matter not covered is not covered is so obvious that it seems absurd to recite it.”).
158

159

Red River Compact, supra note 2, § 5.03(b) (emphasis added).

160

Id. § 6.03(b) (emphasis added).

161

Russello, 464 U.S. at 23 (1983).

See Alabama v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 2295, 2312–13 (2010) (“We are especially
reluctant to read absent terms into an interstate compact given the federalism and separation-ofpowers concerns that would arise were we to rewrite an agreement among sovereign States, to which
the political branches consented.”).
162

163

See supra notes 159–60 and accompanying text.

164

See Red River Compact, supra note 2, § 5.05.

165

See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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The drafting history of the Compact also supports the argument Reach
II, subbasin 5 was intended to be a borderless pool for all states. When courts
interpret compacts, they carefully consider the parties’ intent.166 Further, the
negotiation history must be looked at when interpreting ambiguous language,
and previous drafts and the circumstances surrounding the current language are
aids to find the drafters’ intent.167 In Tarrant, both parties used the previous drafts
as support for their positions, but the drafting history supports the conclusion the
drafters specifically intended to create a basin without restricting access for each
state within their respective boundaries.168
An early draft of the Compact in 1966 contained specific language referring
to state power within their boundaries.169 This language referred to explicit
boundaries within Reach II, as applied to “unassigned” waters, which would
become “excess” water (subbasin 5) in future drafts.170 The 1972 draft required
that the states would have “free and unrestricted use of the waters of this
subbasin [5].”171 The language of that draft still contained limits to the state
boundaries as found in the 1966 draft.172 However, in 1976, the drafters deleted
the language “within their boundaries,” and “in their respective states” with regards
to Reach II, subbasin 5.173 But the drafters kept that language elsewhere in the
Compact.174 States had free use of the waters of subbasin 5 with the restrictions of
minimum flow requirements at the Arkansas-Louisiana border, and the twentyfive percent guarantee.175
The OWRB argued the language “free and unrestricted use” implies a
limitation to state boundaries.176 It claimed the use among the multiple states
could not be so broad without restricting the states to their respective areas.177
But, the twenty-five percent guarantee acts as a limit to the states’ use within
the subbasin, just like a restriction to use within each state’s respective boundary

166

Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765, 1771 n.4 (2011).

Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 221, 235 n.5 (1991) (negotiation history); Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 542 (2001) (previous drafts).
167

See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 103, at 41–43; Brief for Respondents, supra note 112,
at 45–47.
168

See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 103, at 42 (discussing the precise language and location
of such language in the 1966 draft).
169

170

Id.

171

Brief for Respondents, supra note 112, at 46.

172

Id.

173

Id.

174

Id.

175

Id. at 46– 47.

176

Id. at 13.

177

Id.
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would.178 Thus, there was no need for the “implied” state boundary limitations
under the Compact to protect against abuse.
Significantly, prior drafts had language specifically limiting the right to access
water under the Compact to state boundaries, and the drafters abandoned that
language in the final version.179 If compact drafters consider and reject language,
such actions demonstrate intent not to include such language in the final version.180
State boundary limitations remained elsewhere in the Compact, but were omitted
in the section describing Reach II, subbasin 5.181 By changing the language, the
parties to the Compact contemplated states could make interstate diversions from
Reach II, subbasin 5.
The course of dealings under the Compact also demonstrate the Compact
allows cross-border diversions. The Supreme Court found it important that no
state sought cross-border diversions within Reach II, subbasin 5 until the current
case.182 The Court failed to recognize that a need for such cross-border diversions
did not previously arise.183 More importantly, the Court should have relied on
the parties’ course of dealings during the negotiations.184 While the Red River
Compact negotiations were proceeding in the 1950s and 1960s, Oklahoma sought
federal funding for dam projects along the Kiamichi River, which is in Reach II,
subbasin 1.185 There was not enough demand in Oklahoma for the projects to
be approved, so the Oklahoma Legislature subsequently included demand from
north Texas in their analysis, including from the Tarrant Water District; this
resulted in a feasible project that Congress approved.186 Under the Compact, the
water storage created by the projects would be available for unlimited, exclusive
use within subbasin 1, which is entirely within Oklahoma.187
See Red River Compact, supra note 2, § 5.05 (stating the twenty-five percent guarantee language).
178

179

See supra notes 169–75 and accompanying text.

Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364, 374 (2008) (upholding
specific intent to leave out the term “economic” found in earlier drafts, but omitted in the final
version); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 378 n.13 (2000) (finding that
Congress, in drafting legislation considered and rejected specific language was indicative of intent
to purposely leave out in the final version).
180

181

See Red River Compact, supra note 2, §§ 5.03(b) & 6.03(b).

182

Tarrant, 133 S. Ct. at 2135.

See, e.g., Bureau of Reclamation, Colorado River Basin Water Supply and Demand
Study, SR-34 (2012) (describing climate change trends of decreased supply and increased demand).
183

Pac. Portland Cement Co. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 178 F.2d 541, 552 (9th Cir.
1949) (noting that “prior negotiations and surrounding circumstances may be considered” when
trying to determine the meaning of words used in a contract).
184

Brief for Petitioner, supra note 103, at 45 (citing S. Doc. No. 145, Report of the District
Engineer, 87th Cong. (Sept. 24, 1962)).
185

186

Id.; Flood Control Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-874, tit. II, 76 Stat. 1173 (1962).

187

Red River Compact, supra note 2, § 5.01.
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It is unreasonable that Congress would approve such a project on the premise
that waters would be available to Texas and then approve a compact preventing
Texas from accessing those waters.188 The only fair interpretation is that, within
Reach II, subbasin 1, waters were for Oklahoma’s unlimited use, but any unused,
excessive water would flow into subbasin 5, where Texas would have access to such
waters under the Compact with the flow restrictions and percentage allocation
provided in section 5.05.189 Any other interpretation would allow Oklahoma
to hoard water because the projects created a surplus supply in Oklahoma.190 If
Oklahoma or any other state would be allowed to hoard water, the only remedy
would be an accounting.191 To date, no state has sought an accounting due to the
time, cost, and uncertainty in implementation.192
The Supreme Court also erred in its analysis of the relinquishment of state
sovereignty because the states voluntarily surrendered their sovereignty in the
Compact. The Court held allowing states to divert water across state boundaries
would violate the strong presumption of states retaining their sovereignty.193
Although state sovereignty is an important factor, the Court put the most weight
on this factor and failed to see how the states voluntarily ceded their sovereign
power when they agreed to the Compact.194 The Compact language provides that
“[e]ach state may freely administer water rights and uses in accordance with the
laws of that state,” which demonstrates intent to retain state sovereign power.195
Section 2.01 continues and states “such uses shall be subject to the availability of
water in accordance with the apportionments made by this Compact.”196 Further,
section 2.10 discusses the inability of the Compact to interfere with state rights
regarding use and control of their waters.197 But this is only as long as such actions
are consistent with the states’ obligations under the Compact.198 The states freely
negotiated and approved the Compact, which contains explicit language limiting
their powers.199 The states specifically allowed the Compact to preempt their own

188
Although Congress does not have to contemplate all circumstances before approving a
compact, Congress has rejected proposed compacts before because of the circumstances. See supra
note 31 and accompanying text.
189

See Red River Compact, supra note 2, § 5.05.

190

Brief for Petitioner, supra note 103, at 45.

Red River Compact, supra note 2, § 2.11; Thorson, supra note 16, at 434 (discussing the
difficulties associated with an accounting).
191

192

See supra notes 86–90 and accompanying text.

193

Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120, 2131–33 (2013).

194

Id. at 2132–33.

195

Red River Compact, supra note 2, § 2.01.

196

Id.

197

Id. § 2.10.

198

Id.

199

See supra notes 195 –98 and accompanying text.
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water laws.200 Therefore, their sovereign power was not involuntarily limited, and
the Court should not have weighed this factor as heavily.
Finally, policy demands Tarrant be able to divert water in Oklahoma for
its immediate use.201 Temperature and precipitation trends make cooperation
between states important to make sure water gets to where it is needed.202 In
a Bureau of Reclamation study for the nearby Colorado River basin, a recent
analysis suggests a deficit of 3.2 million acre-feet (maf ) between supply and
demand for basin water by 2060.203 This is equal to roughly ten trillion gallons.204
With demand increasing in metropolitan areas like Dallas-Fort Worth, and supply
becoming less stable, states need to cooperate to make sure water goes to where
it is most needed.205 Both Oklahoma and Arkansas rejected Tarrant’s attempts to
purchase water, and now Oklahoma is attempting to hoard excess water while an
expanding population to the south is looking for more water to meet its needs.206
This is especially important because water is a unique resource that represents the
“basis of life on Earth and the foundation of all civilizations.”207
Further, Oklahoma is a hybrid state, meaning it acknowledges both prior
appropriation and riparian doctrines in regard to surface water rights.208 Although
it still recognizes riparian rights, the state has sought to limit such rights in favor
of the trend of western states towards prior appropriation.209 With foundations
in mining law, prior appropriation was developed to put water to use to populate
and produce economic prosperity in the West.210 With this policy, the two
200
“[V]ia the supremacy clause, a state’s compact obligations can be enforced under federal
authority, taking precedence over inconsistent state law.” Thompson, supra note 25, at 902.
201

See infra notes 202–12 and accompanying text.

Bureau of Reclamation, Colorado River Basin Water Supply and Demand Study,
Study Report, SR-34 (2012), http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/crbstudy/finalreport/
Study%20Report/CRBS_Study_Report_FINAL.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2013).
202

203

Id.

One acre-foot is equivalent to 325,851 gallons. Thomas V. Cech, Principles
Resources, Appendix (3d ed. 2010).
204

of

Water

205
See supra note 3 and accompanying text (stating that Dallas is growing); supra notes
202–204 and accompanying text (describing that supply is variable).
206
See Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120, 2128 (2013) (describing how
Tarrant’s customer base is expanding).
207

Thomas V. Cech, Principles of Water Resources 1 (3d ed. 2010).

Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Oklahoma Water Res. Bd., 855 P.2d 568, 571 (Okla.
1990). For basic doctrine elements compare A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Prior Appropriation in
the New West, 41 Nat. Resources J. 769 (Fall 2001) (prior appropriation), with 65 C.J.S. Navigable
Waters § 93 (2013) (riparian rights).
208

209
See Thompson, supra note 25, at 211–12 (legislature attempting to limit unused riparian
rights and dispute between two types of users is resolved by seniority of right).

See Charles F. Wilkinson, Crossing the Next Meridian: Land, Water, and the Future
West 231–35 (1992).

210

of the
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major components are “first in time, first in right” and “beneficial use.”211 Prior
appropriation stresses the idea of putting the water to use instead of hoarding
it because a right may be forfeited upon non-use.212 The OWRB’s actions of
attempting to hoard water are in direct conflict with the policy basis for the water
laws of the state, and Tarrant should be able to appropriate water from Oklahoma.
Ultimately, the Court erred in preventing Tarrant from asserting its claim
under the Compact within Oklahoma and Reach II, subbasin 5. The plain
meaning guarantees each state an entitlement to twenty-five percent of the excess
in that subbasin.213 The drafters intentionally omitted limitations on water use
within state boundaries in the provision describing Reach II, subbasin 5.214 Prior
drafts of the Compact and the course of dealings between the parties demonstrate
the intent to create a common pool of water in subbasin 5 for the benefit of all
states.215 In the Compact the states voluntarily abrogated their sovereign powers.216
Finally, policy requires that waters should be diverted to where they are needed in
the spirit of cooperation between states.217

Dormant Commerce Clause
Oklahoma water statutes and procedures governing the interstate water not
covered in the Red River Compact violate the dormant Commerce Clause. The
Supreme Court refused to engage in the dormant Commerce Clause analysis
because it held, under the Compact, Oklahoma is entitled to all waters within their
boundaries as well as within Reach II, subbasin 5, pending a call for accounting.218
The Court was wrong in its holding because there were unappropriated waters not
covered by the Compact which fall under the definition of interstate commerce.219
These waters are the amount above twenty-five percent of the excess that exist
within Oklahoma and Reach II, subbasin 5. Congress did not consent to the
protectionist state laws of Oklahoma.220 The Oklahoma laws are discriminatory
on their face and in their effects.221 The legitimate public purpose is not enough
to overcome the subsequent strict scrutiny test.222
211

Id.

212

See Okla. Admin. Code § 785:20-9-3 (2013).

213

See supra notes 150–56 and accompanying text.

214

See supra notes 157– 65 and accompanying text.

215

See supra notes 166–92 and accompanying text.

216

See supra notes 193–200 and accompanying text.

217

See supra notes 201–17 and accompanying text.

218

Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120, 2137 (2013).

219

See infra notes 223–34 and accompanying text.

220

See infra notes 235–42 and accompanying text.

221

See infra notes 243–50 and accompanying text.

222

See infra notes 251–70 and accompanying text.
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The water involved in the case is defined as an interstate commercial
medium. Water, being “essential for human survival,” deserves “significant federal
interest.”223 As such, water passing between states is interstate commercial activity
susceptible to regulation under the Commerce Clause. Further, the majority of
developed water in the country is used for irrigation, especially in the western, arid
states.224 The waters of the Red River basin are considered interstate commerce.225
There are unappropriated interstate waters that the Compact does not
govern.226 It is unclear whether Oklahoma has a surplus beyond the twenty-five
percent guarantee under the Compact, but according to at least one report, it could
be as high as fifty-nine percent of the excess water in subbasin 5.227 If Oklahoma
has more than its share within its borders, Oklahoma can only access twenty-five
percent of the excess in subbasin 5.228 Any surplus above the twenty-five percent
should flow downstream; if Oklahoma uses that surplus it violates the Compact.229
The main stream of the Red River is within the borders of Oklahoma, so the
excess flows go through Arkansas and Louisiana, where the twenty-five percent
guarantee of the excess also limits those states.230 The unappropriated remainder
eventually flows out of the basin and into the Mississippi River.231 Therefore, there
are unappropriated waters under the Compact to which the dormant Commerce
Clause would apply.232 Other studies show that thirty-four percent of the basin
lies within Texas, so there is uncertainty about the amount of water in subbasin 5

223

Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 953 (1982).

Thompson, supra note 25, at 3 (quoting John D. Leshy, Notes on a Progressive National
Water Policy, 3 Harv. J.L. & Pol’y 132, 134–37 (2009)). The amount of groundwater used for
agriculture, which is a global commercial enterprise, was important in determining interstate
commerce. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 953. Within Texas, irrigation is a major use of Red River basin
water. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, Basin 02: Red River, http://www.tceq.
state.tx.us/assets/public/comm_exec/pubs/sfr/050_00/vol2_basin02.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2013).
224

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 21 (1824) (“It is not unreasonable to say, that what are called
the waters of New-York, are, to purposes of navigation and commercial regulation, the waters of
the United States . . . their use, for those purposes, seemed to be entrusted to the exclusive power
of Congress.”).
225

226

See infra notes 227–334 and accompanying text.

Brief for Petitioner, supra note 103, at 9 n.5 (summarizing relevant points of the Report of the
Engineering Advisory Committee to the Red River Compact Commission, which covered average flows
taken between the 1930s and 1960s and reported that Oklahoma has fifty-nine percent of the water
in subbasin 5, while Texas retained only eleven percent).
227

228

See Red River Compact, supra note 2, § 5.05.

Id. See also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 103, at 5–6 (stating the mainstream of the Red
River is too high in salt and chloride contamination for suitable domestic and industrial uses).
229

230

Red River Compact, supra note 2, § 5.05.

231

Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120, 2136 App. B (2013).

It is possible that if Tarrant wins under this argument that they would be required to
pay just compensation for the water. See Hudson Cnty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349,
355–56 (1908).
232
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within each state.233 Although accounting is allowed under the Compact, it can be
expensive and time-consuming, and the variability of water leads to uncertainty
in the results.234
Congress did not consent to the state laws governing the interstate waters of
the Red River. In subsequent years, the Supreme Court laid down the standard
for Congressional assent to state control of interstate commerce.235 The consent
must be “unmistakably clear,” and “manifest unambiguous consent.”236 The
Court demonstrated in Sporhase how much deference it will give to Congress
when determining if Congress has granted the right to govern specific instances
of interstate commerce.237 In that case, the Court focused on whether Congress
granted Nebraska the right to govern groundwater, which the Court found to be
interstate commerce.238 The Reclamation Act of 1902 asserted, “nothing in this
Act shall be construed as affecting . . . the laws of any State or Territory relating
to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation.”239
Such language did not constitute congressional consent.240 In the Tarrant dispute,
the Compact has similar language, but is even weaker than Sporhase because the
Compact expressly limits the state control to the obligations listed therein.241
Further, Congress assented to the weaker language when it approved the Compact,
making it statutorily binding, like the Reclamation Act.242 The Compact does
not contain language that is “unmistakably clear,” so Congress did not intend to
convey regulatory powers of interstate commerce to Oklahoma.243
Under the next step of the dormant Commerce Clause analysis, the Oklahoma
statutes were discriminatory on their face.244 There is a strong presumption
against a state’s economic protectionism that blatantly discriminates against
another state.245 Specifically, Oklahoma statutes title 82, sections 1086.1(A)(3)
and 105.12(A) declare that water must be put to use in Oklahoma “so out-of-state
downstream users will not acquire vested rights therein,” and explicitly express a
233

Brief for Respondents, supra note 112, at 15.

234

Red River Compact, supra note 2, § 2.11; see supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text.

235

See Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).

236

Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 458 (“manifest”); Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460–61 (“unmistakably clear”).

237

Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 959–60 (1982).

238

Id.

239

Id. at 959.

240

Id.

241

See supra notes 193–200 and accompanying text.

242

See Red River Compact, supra note 2.

243

See supra notes 235–36 and accompanying text.

See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 103, at 17–19 (discussing the Oklahoma water laws
discriminating against out-of-state users).
244

245

See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
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preference to in-state uses.246 Facial discrimination occurs when a statute “overtly
blocks the flow of interstate commerce at the State’s borders.”247 By excluding outof-state users of interstate waters unappropriated under the Compact, Oklahoma
has facially discriminated against out-of-state applicants in blocking interstate
commerce from crossing its border.
Even if the Oklahoma statutes are not discriminatory on their face, they are
discriminatory in their effects. The Oklahoma Attorney General, in an official
directive said, “it is unrealistic that an out-of-state user is a proper permit
applicant.”248 The opinion tells the agency responsible for administering water
rights that out-of-state users do not meet the criteria for a permit. Although
not written into statutes, such a policy statement is evidence of a purpose to
discriminate against out-of-state applicants because they are prevented from
obtaining permits as a result of the directive.249 Further, the time frame for outof-state users to put a project to beneficial use is only seven years, while the project
intended by Tarrant would require fifteen years to complete.250 According to the
statutes, if Tarrant were an in-state user, the time restriction would not apply.251
The effects of such a scheme would result in potential out-of-state applicants
looking for alternatives elsewhere rather than risk a large investment if there was
uncertainty in meeting the completion requirement.
The statutory scheme is discriminatory, either facially or in its effects, so it must
pass a strict scrutiny test to be valid.252 The only way the state can overcome the
invalidity is to prove the statutes support local benefits and no nondiscriminatory
alternatives exist.253 In this case, the OWRB argued the dormant Commerce
Clause did not apply and never asserted a public policy argument.254 However,
one of the statutes asserts water should be used for the “benefit” of Oklahoma,
“so that out-of-state downstream users will not acquire vested rights therein to

246

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 82, §§ 1086.1(A)(3), 105.12(A) (2013).

Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 –37 (1979) (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)).
247

248

Okla. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 77-274 (1978).

See Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 677 (1981) (finding a declaration
by the governor evidenced a statutory scheme intending to limit out of state truck traffic instead of
the declared public purpose of safety).
249

250
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 82, § 105.16(A) (2013); Brief for Petitioner, supra note 103, at 18
(discussing Oklahoma water laws discriminating against out-of-state users).
251

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 82, § 105.16(B) (2013).

Kassel, 450 U.S. at 624 (facially discriminatory); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of
Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994) (discriminatory in its effects); Maine v. Taylor, 477
U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (requires a high scrutiny).
252

253

Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).

254

Brief for Respondents, supra note 112, at 27.
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the detriment of the citizens of this state.”255 Further, the Oklahoma Attorney
General discusses that the prevention of water, a “valuable resource,” from being
bound by out-of-state users.256 The support for this opinion stems from a vague
claim regarding “public health and general welfare.”257
If the argument is to conserve water for the benefit of its people, then any
state can make the same claim for any natural resource it may have within its
boundaries and hoard it.258 Oklahoma has lost this argument before when it
attempted to conserve natural gas by preventing interstate pipelines.259 Water is
even more important a resource because it is the basis of life on Earth.260 The
Court was unimpressed with the conservation argument and found the statutes
violated the dormant Commerce Clause.261
Further, a nondiscriminatory alternative exists. Under the Compact,
Oklahoma can store as much water as it requires in Reach II, subbasin 1 for the
exclusive use within the state.262 Water is a resource that should be distributed
nationally to where it is currently needed.263 Individual states should not be
allowed to hoard it for possible future use. The benefit of protecting the interests
of Oklahoma citizens would not carry enough weight to overcome the virtually
per se invalidity assigned by the discriminatory nature of the statutory scheme.264
A better policy argument is that Oklahoma is restricting out-of-state
water uses to maintain minimum flows for environmental protection because
environmental concern has been the only legitimate public policy to overcome
the strict scrutiny test.265 However, western states have only started to recognize
in-stream flow rights for environmental purposes.266 Further, this is not the best
255

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 82, §§ 1086.1(A)(3) (2013).

256

Okla. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 77-274 (1978).

257

Id.

See West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 255 (1911) (“If the states have such
power, a singular situation might result. Pennsylvania might keep its coal, the Northwest its timber,
the mining states their minerals.”).
258

259

Id.

260

Id. at 254–55.

261

Id.

262

Red River Compact, supra note 2, § 5.01.

See, e.g., In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River
System, 835 P.2d 273, 279 (Wyo. 1992) (“Water is the lifeblood of Wyoming. It is a scarce resource
which must be effectively managed and efficiently used to meet the various demands of society.”).
263

See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 140–44 (1986) (exemplifying when legitimate public
interest can overcome a discriminatory law).
264

265

Id. (discussing skewed balancing test where environmental protection prevailed for the state).

See generally Thompson, supra note 25, at 215–21 (discussing the current evolution of
in-stream flow rights in the western states).
266
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alternative for accomplishing such a policy without discrimination.267 Oklahoma
could set minimum flows for rivers that govern any appropriative right, or issue
conditional permits reserving the right to reduce diversions when environmental
circumstances require.268 None of these alternatives would be discriminatory,
unlike the present scheme, because they only affect in-state users.269 Further, the
need of water for an expanding population in North Texas for domestic use is a
legitimate public policy, instead of leaving water in reservoirs, where it evaporates
into the atmosphere instead of being put to use.270 This is especially important in
western states, where prior appropriation is based on putting water to beneficial
use or forfeiting the right to it.271

Effects on Wyoming
Wyoming has been involved in interstate water compacts since their inception
in 1922.272 To date, Wyoming has seven compacts concerning interstate waterways
that are some of the largest and most important waterways in the nation.273
Wyoming is “situated astride the Continental Divide, and as a result provides
the headwaters for four major river basins in the western United States, including
the Missouri-Mississippi, Green-Colorado, and Snake-Columbia Rivers.”274
The Great Salt Lake Basin also carves out a portion of the state.275 Because of
this, Wyoming has had disputes over the use of interstate waters that have led to
multiple compacts and apportionments.276

267

Maine, 477 U.S. at 146.

See Thompson, supra note 25, at 219 (discussing different ways prior appropriation states
can manage aqueous environmental issues).
268

269

See supra notes 77–84 and accompanying text.

Domestic uses are typically considered more important than any other use. See, e.g., Wyo.
Stat. Ann. § 41-3-102 (2013) (stating municipal use is the penultimate preferred use, behind
drinking water).
270

271

Okla. Admin. Code § 785:20-9-3 (2013).

272

See Colorado River Compact, 42 Stat. 171 (1922).

See id.; Belle Fourche River Compact, 58 Stat. 94 (1944); Upper Colorado River Basin
Compact, 63 Stat. 37 (1949); Snake River Compact, 64 Stat. 32 (1950); Yellowstone River
Compact, 65 Stat. 663 (1951); Amended Bear River Compact, 72 Stat. 38 (1958); Upper Niobrara
River Compact, 83 Stat. 86 (1969).
273

274
James J. Jacobs & Donald J. Brosz, Wyoming’s Water Resources, http://library.wrds.
uwyo.edu/wrp/93-12/93-12.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2013) [hereinafter Jacobs & Brosz]; see also
James J. Jacobs et al., Wyoming Water Law: A Summary (1995), available at http://library.wrds.
uwyo.edu/wrp/90-17/90-17.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2013) (describing the history and basic
tenets of Wyoming water law).
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See Jacobs & Brosz, supra note 274.

See Colorado River Compact, 42 Stat. 171 (1922); Belle Fourche River Compact, 58 Stat.
94 (1944); Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, 63 Stat. 31 (1949); Snake River Compact, 64
Stat. 29 (1950); Yellowstone River Compact, 65 Stat. 663 (1951); Amended Bear River Compact,
72 Stat. 38 (1958); Upper Niobrara River Compact, 83 Stat. 86 (1969).
276

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol14/iss1/4

26

Annes: Water Law - Cooperation Abandoned to Allow Hoarding of Water: The

2014

Case Note

131

The Supreme Court’s decision on how to interpret ambiguities in interstate
water compacts could impact any compact to which Wyoming is a signatory.
Specifically, the Court’s decision in Tarrant could impact the Upper Niobrara
Compact.277 Despite a tiny portion of the river being within the boundaries of
Wyoming, the compact grants “no restrictions on the use of the surface waters
of the Upper Niobrara River by Wyoming.”278 The language did not expressly
grant Wyoming the right to divert waters in Nebraska, where the majority of
the river flows, but only limits the use to Wyoming laws and certain limitations
within Nebraska.279
With this decision, Nebraska may be able to set further limitations on
Wyoming since there is no expressed granting of diversion rights for Wyoming
within Nebraska. Nebraska could enact statutes similar to Oklahoma’s, where
out-of-state applicants were virtually denied the right to divert water.280 Wyoming
water users would be unable to access their share of water from the Upper Niobrara
River under the compact.
Further, the Supreme Court has already held that certain interstate water
practices in Nebraska violated the dormant Commerce Clause.281 But if a case
concerning this compact were presented preventing out-of-state permittees in
Nebraska, Tarrant may be the basis for allowing such laws.282 Despite previous
contrary precedent, this could occur, as preventing surface waters from leaving the
state would be an obvious violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.283
Wyoming will be at the heart of litigation over interstate waters and the
compacts governing them.284 In fact, Wyoming is currently part of litigation
concerning the Yellowstone River Compact.285 Many of the compacts could run
into cross-border diversion issues similar to Tarrant and the OWRB. There are
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Upper Niobrara River Compact, art. V, 83 Stat. 86 (1969).

278

Id.

279

Id.

Cf. Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120, 2136–37 (2013); see supra
note 6 and accompanying text.
280

281

See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 959–60 (1982).

Id. at 960 (discussing reciprocity requirement for exporting groundwater outside the state
violated dormant Commerce Clause); see Tarrant, 133 S. Ct. at 2136–37.
282

283

See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 945–954.

See Bureau of Reclamation, Colorado River Basin Water Supply and Demand Study,
Study Report, SR-34 (2012); Anne MacKinnon, Historic and Future Challenges in Western
Water Law: The Case of Wyoming, 6 Wyo. L. Rev. 291 (2006) (discussing, in general, the issues
affecting Wyoming).
284

285
See Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765, 1769 (2011) (parties are still presently in
litigation over other issues with the compact).
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four compacts where Wyoming is a signatory with express language granting
cross-border diversions of water: the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact,
Snake River Compact, Yellowstone River Compact, and Amended Bear River
Compact.286 The Snake River Compact is more specific and has implementation
instructions on how a state can obtain cross-boundary water rights.287 The
Yellowstone River Compact also has a detailed explanation concerning which
state laws apply in conceivable situations involving cross-border water rights.288
The Upper Niobrara River Compact does not expressly grant cross-border rights,
and compacts that expressly allow cross-border diversion still have incomplete
procedures for implementing such rights.289 With possible ambiguities in the
compacts, the Court’s emphasis on state sovereignty, industry standard, and
course of performance has set a new precedent for compact interpretation that
may affect Wyoming in the future.290 Specifically, being an upstream party to all
of its compacts, Wyoming should look favorably on the overall result of Tarrant.291
It sets a precedent that the Court will favor an upstream state storing water at the
detriment of other states in the compact.

Conclusion
The Supreme Court erred in Tarrant because it improperly interpreted the
Compact and did not properly apply the dormant Commerce Clause test. Using
interpretive tools, the language of the Compact grants the states a guarantee
to the waters within a borderless pool—Reach II, subbasin 5.292 Oklahoma’s
prohibition against out-of-state permittees concerning interstate waters that the
Compact does not govern violated the dormant Commerce Clause.293 Wyoming,
being a signatory to multiple compacts, is sure to be involved in litigation in the
future, and this holding is important for any future case dealing with compact
interpretation.294 Ultimately, Wyoming cannot rely on the language of its
compacts to protect its interests in interstate waters.
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See Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, 63 Stat. 31 (1949); Snake River Compact, 64
Stat. 29 (1950); Yellowstone River Compact, 65 Stat. 663 (1951); Amended Bear River Compact,
72 Stat. 38 (1958).
287

Snake River Compact, art. III.
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Yellowstone River Compact, art. VII.
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Upper Niobrara River Compact, art. V.

290

See supra notes 100–39 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 273–76 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 157–217 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 218–71 and accompanying text.

294

See supra notes 272–89 and accompanying text.
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